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INTRODUCTION
Innovation is driven to a remarkable extent by principles of 
contracting.1  Rather than rejecting formal legal entanglements in a fast-
* Associate Professor of Business Law and Kelley Venture Fellow, Indiana University.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges the insights of participants in the “Managing the Legal 
Nexus of Intellectual Property, Employees, and Global Trade” colloquium jointly sponsored 
by Ross School of Business, University of Michigan and Terry College of Business, 
University of Georgia.  Thanks to colloquium organizers Lynda Oswald and Marisa 
Pagnattaro.  Indiana University provided financial support for this research. 
 1.  See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the 
Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015) (discussing the use of restrictive 
covenants — along with other strategies — to control the inputs of innovation); Ronald J. 
Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of 
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 181 
(2013) (stating that “when standard theory predicts vertical integration as the response to 
combining different capabilities in the face of uncertainty, parties chose contract – not 
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paced innovation environment, parties who thrive through intellectual 
property creation and expansion are embracing the certainty of contracts as 
a means of capturing their investment.2  This is nowhere more evident than 
in the health care industry, where innovation is highly valued and capturing 
investment is required to compete.3  In this industry, the new world of 
technology-driven innovation and the old world of strict formal legal 
documents unite in the hopes of capturing the process, technology, or 
system that will prove to be the competitive advantage. 
This relationship between contract and innovation is the source of 
extensive academic discussion.4  Contracts are recognized today as the best 
means for interaction among parties without an established relationship but, 
even more so, for minimizing the uncertainties that are the very nature of 
innovation.5  Contract law consistently evolves to accommodate the needs 
of firms; this has implications not only for the firms, but the individuals the 
firms target as the “inputs of innovation.”6
The health care industry presents a particularly unique innovation 
environment in which to consider the use of contracts to drive innovation 
by employees.  As intellectual property rights are increasingly valued as 
assets to monetize,7 the contracts developed for creation of these assets 
common ownership – as the structure of their collaboration.”) (hereinafter “Novel 
Contractual Forms”); Sonia Baldia, The Transaction Cost Problem in International 
Intellectual Property Exchange and Innovation Markets, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 20-21 
(2013) (noting the contractual arrangements that allows for the optimal flow of knowledge 
in open business innovation environments); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. 
Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration, and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 449 (2009) (hereinafter “Vertical Disintegration”) (noting that 
innovation requires novel contracting arrangements). 
 2.  Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, The Essential Role of Courts 
for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2177, 2178 (2014) (stating that “parties to 
innovative contracts and those operating in innovative environments rely much more 
heavily on lawyers and contract documents than do their counterparts in non-innovative 
environments”). 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part I. 
 5.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Novel Contractual Forms, supra note 1, at 180-81 
(summarizing the high levels of uncertainty and resulting contractual response to cascading 
innovations following the exogenous shock of “the information revolution”). 
 6.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 790 (describing the “inputs of innovation” as “skills, 
experience, know-how, professional relationships, creativity, and entrepreneurial energies” 
and noting that these are now “subject to control and propertization”). See generally Larry
A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage,
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 772-79 (2010) (discussing contracting for innovation and contracts as 
governance structures). See also infra Part I.A. 
 7.  Baldia, supra note 1, at 20-21 (stating that “[f]irms can no longer afford to ignore 
potential return on R&D investment from internally developed, but unused, IP.  Rather, they 
must actively exchange such IP with third parties better situated to develop and 
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must incentivize employees who are drivers of innovation.8  This article 
examines the current health care industry’s strategic contracting regime of 
invention assignment agreements designed to promote innovation through 
human capital and posits whether the regime incentivizes innovation. 
Understanding innovation and, in particular, what motivates 
innovation in the health care sector, is increasingly important.9  A major 
development utilized by firms to promote innovation is to capture 
knowledge of employees at all levels.  Capturing knowledge and asserting 
rights to employee-created ideas is a trend increasingly recognized by legal 
scholars.10  For example, firms in the United States employing engineers 
and scientists require these employees or agents, nearly universally, to 
assign their inventions to their employer.11  Such assignments reflect the 
beliefs that innovation should come from all employees at all times and that 
the organization “owns” any such innovation produced by their 
employees.12  That same phenomenon is now occurring in the medical 
field, as the proportion of physicians employed by hospital systems 
increases to respond to the difficult provider market.13  As the health care 
industry undergoes the exogenous shock of new regulations and 
technological changes as part of the information revolution, is it responding 
in a way that will promote innovation?  A key question for health care 
providers in remaining competitive in an increasingly challenging market is 
how to maximize knowledge ownership, in particular, the potential for 
“human capital.”14  In the health care industry this issue combines 
commercialize it through various models, . . . which can lead to increased technology 
development.”). 
 8.  But see Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 
492 (2015) (asserting that it is possible that “IP theory is wrong about what motivates 
people to create”). 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See, e.g., Andres Sawicki, Buying Teams, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 665 (2015) 
(discussing the use of invention assignment agreements by start-up firms); Lobel, supra note
1, at 790 (stating that “[t]he new cognitive property has emerged under the radar, 
commodifying intellectual intangibles that have traditionally been kept outside of the scope 
of intellectual property”). 
 11.  Parker Howell, Whose Invention Is It Anyway? Employee Invention-Assignment 
Agreements and Their Limits, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 79, 80 (2012) (discussing 
intellectual property right assignments in America).
 12.  Julian Birkinshaw, Cyril Bouquet, & J.L. Barsoux, The 5 Myths of Innovation, 52 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 43, 43 (2011) (stating that “the new imperative is to view 
innovation as an all the time, everywhere capability”).  But see Baldia, supra note 1, at 20 
(distinguishing between “open access innovation” (OAI) which promotes free access and 
use of IP and “open business innovation” (OBI), in which the outputs are privately 
controlled and managed). 
 13.  See infra Part II. 
 14.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 790 (introducing the “growing field of human capital law”).  
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intellectual property — primarily patent law — the Bayh-Dole Act,15
common law, and contract law, with some important underlying 
employment considerations.16
This article examines contracting for innovation in the context of a 
highly regulated industry.  Part I presents the two prevailing theories 
concerning the consequences of contracting for innovation in a dynamic 
marketplace: taming uncertainty or constraining human capital.  Part II 
surveys the health care industry and the changes in incentives for 
innovation, including the Affordable Care Act.17  Part III then explores 
intellectual property created by agents and employees, and changes in 
patent law stemming from the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act.18  Part III highlights the Bayh-Dole Act’s crucial role in transforming 
innovation in research and teaching hospitals and discusses the renewed 
importance of invention assignment agreements and contract law following 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stanford v. Roche.19
Part IV further examines contracting for human capital in the context 
of research and teaching hospitals.  Are effective assignment agreements 
vital in protecting innovation and containing health care costs?  Do such 
agreements strike the best balance in motivating innovation or does the 
current trend value short-term monetization of intellectual property over 
long-term innovation?  This article concludes with a cautionary note 
regarding the use of assignment agreements to promote innovation by 
employees and agents whose primary responsibility is delivering heath care 
and a proposal for limiting the practice to promote physician engagement in 
the process of innovation.  In a quickly evolving industry, strategies 
motivated more by monetizing intellectual property assets over 
collaborative engagement with innovators may prove to limit the strategic 
advantages of contracting for innovation. 
See also Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to 
Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 982 (2012) (constructing 
employee-employer contracting as a “knowledge ownership dispute”). 
 15.  Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§200-
212 (2012)). 
 16.  Lobel, supra note 1, 790 (describing human capital law at the “intersections of IP 
law, contract and employment law, and antitrust law”). 
 17.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 18.  Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
 19.  Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188 (2011). 
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I. CONTRACTING FOR INNOVATION AND COLLABORATION
Innovation is a process rather than a singular outcome, product, or 
event.20  As the process is continuous in the most advanced innovation 
environments, the structures to support innovation must be similarly 
evolving and flexible.21  Contracts are the tool that best matches the process 
necessary for innovation.22  When parties focus on strategic networking to 
create efficiencies in innovation, contracts evolve.23  The result may be the 
promotion of interaction between the parties, thereby permitting extensive 
collaboration.24  However, in the context of agent-or-employee–created 
innovation, evolving contract law may undermine the balance developed by 
intellectual property law.25  This section examines the promise of contract 
law in innovation and the emerging problem presented by contracting for 
knowledge ownership. 
A. The Promise: Taming Uncertainty Through Contract 
At the firm level, uncertainty is now the goal of innovation rather than 
the bane.26  Legal theorists, who seek to understand the information age 
economy and its priority on constant innovation, note that the stability 
achieved through vertical integration in the industrial-age economy is no 
 20.  Although there is not singular agreement around how best to characterize 
innovation. See, e.g., Keith Sawyer, The Collaborative Nature of Innovation, 30 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 293, 296-97 (2009) (explaining that “I define ‘innovation’ as the emergence of 
a viable product or service that has an impact on the world, in contrast to ‘creativity,’ which 
I define as the generation of new, useful, and nonobvious ideas”); Brett Frischmann, 
Innovation and Institutions, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 357 (2000) (stating that “[a]n innovation is 
a pure public good that can be directly consumed or used as an input into the production of 
another good”). 
 21.  See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Vertical Disintegration, supra note 1, at 441 (stating 
that due to “the profusion of new technological possibilities. . . .[i]nnovations cascaded, 
often leading to improvement cycles that became self-perpetuating”). 
 22.  See DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 735 (stating that “[c]ontract is the most flexible, 
strategic tool that the law offers to the business community”). 
 23.  See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 
470-83 (2012) (discussing that parties can use contract law to avoid inefficient liability 
rules).
 24.  See Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (2015) (arguing for 
a more holistic approach to innovation that accounts for the “deeply communal” nature of 
the innovation process). 
 25.  See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1, at 799-800 (describing the abstract-concrete and 
idea-expression distinctions as “the heart of the bargain struck in IP”). 
 26.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Vertical Disintegration, supra note 1, at 441-42. See also 
Lemley, supra note 8, at 465 (“We need a post-scarcity economics, one that accepts rather 
than resists the new opportunities technology will offer us.  Developing that economics is 
the great task of the twenty-first century.”). 
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longer the goal of innovative firms.27  Innovative firms value the 
uncertainty that is a natural consequence of pushing past incumbent 
technology and systems to consider the next disruptive technology that will 
reshape the market.28  There are multiple theories on the basis of “the 
information revolution,”29 but the key developments are perhaps best 
summed up by “globalization, technology, and entrepreneurship.”30
Whereas in the industrial-age economy assets of interest were the machines 
or other tangible property, in the information age economy, assets of 
interest are intangible assets, such as patent rights and other intellectual 
property.31
Observing contracting in this environment, legal theorists note that a 
firm’s move toward embracing constant uncertainty likewise changed the 
private governance structures created through contract.32  In an innovative 
environment, collaborative conditions and sharing of information leads to 
efficient “flow between the firm’s internal innovation process and an 
external environment populated by clients, suppliers, competitors, 
government and private research institutions, or other businesses.”33  As 
Gilson, Sabel, & Scott note in their work on contracting for innovation, the 
firms create contracts to promote this flow of information based on 
unknown and unknowable terms.34  The lack of certain specific contract 
terms does not hinder parties from developing the necessary governance 
structure to create contracts that permit information flow that promote 
 27.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Vertical Disintegration, supra note 1, at 442 (explaining 
that “[i]n the heyday of vertical integration, incumbency was the goal, allowing firms to see 
over the horizon of technical development and providing, through economies of scale, the 
means to realize the possibilities they saw.  Now incumbency is seen as a burden, 
proficiency with current technologies obstructing the view of future directions.”). 
 28.  Id. at 442. See also Baldia, supra note 1, at 20 (stating that “[f]undamentally, 
[open business innovation] allows firms to build and rely on global networks or eco-systems 
of innovation to intake new ideas, develop new products and services, leverage new and 
existing IP core to such products and services, and keep pace with R&D in competitive 
global markets”). 
 29.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Novel Contractual Forms, supra note 1, at 180; Gilson, 
Sabel & Scott, Vertical Disintegration, supra note 1, at 441-42.
 30.  DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 734 (citing George J. Siedel, Six Forces and the Legal 
Environment of Business: The Relative Value of Business Law Among Business Courses, 37 
AM. BUS. L.J. 717, 735-37 (2000)). 
 31.  Sawicki, supra note 10, at 683. 
 32.  DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 775. 
 33.  Baldia, supra note 1, at 15 (dubbed the “innovation ecosystems”). 
 34.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Vertical Disintegration, supra note 1, at 473. See also id. at
452 (explaining that “when the level of uncertainty is high, contracts will be incomplete 
because it simply costs too much (or may be impossible) for contracting parties to foresee 
and then describe appropriately the contractual outcomes for all (or even most) of the 
possible future states of the world that might materialize”). 
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constant innovation;35 rather the uncertainty of specific terms is just a part 
of the uncertainty embraced in innovation environments.  The parties create 
a governance system through contract that allows for a “rich braiding of 
formal and informal terms that deters opportunism during the 
collaborative/learning phase of the contract.”36
The important goal of such “braided” contracts is the promotion of the 
collaborative environment that is necessary for innovation to enhance 
efficiency and to offer market advantages.37  The nature of innovation today 
is “a highly interactive, multi-disciplinary process that involves cooperation 
among a growing and diverse network of organizations and individuals 
across national borders.”38  Rather than focus on definitive rights — what 
contract law and other legal provisions brought to the industrial–age firms 
— the innovation required in the information–age economy focuses on 
contracts that allow sustained interactions for collaboration.39
B. The Problem: Constraining Human Capital 
The promise of contracting for innovation at the firm level looks very 
different from the agent or employee viewpoint.  Legal scholars viewing 
contracting in the information age at the employee/agent level offer a 
different perspective on the means by which firms create sustained 
interactions for collaboration: constraint of human capital.  From this 
perspective, firms have not embraced uncertainty necessarily; instead, they 
have limited uncertainty by placing greater restraints on employees.  It 
would be a vast overstatement to suggest that the use of contracts to 
constrain human capital is a new development given the evolution of the 
law concerning employee-inventor to emphasize the collaborative nature of 
invention.40  Nonetheless, the expanding web of “regulatory and contractual 
 35.  Id. at 458. 
 36.  Id. at 473.
 37.  DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 773 (stating that “[a] strategic contract balances the need 
to minimize the uncertainties inherent in innovation, while providing the flexibility so as not 
to inhibit the creative process”). 
 38.  Baldia, supra note 1, at 15. 
 39.  Lee, supra note 24, at 70. 
 40.  See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the “Fuel of Interest” from the “Fire of 
Genius:” Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127 
(1998).  Fisk concludes that:
If a judge could not see an inventive man as part of the working class, the judge 
vastly increased the employee’s chances of becoming an entrepreneur if he was 
not one already.  Once judges began to see inventive employees as employees 
first and inventors second, it became much harder for the employee to capitalize 
on his ideas. 
Id. at 1198. 
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controls on human property”41 has prompted some to raise an alarm about 
the propertization of employees’ knowledge.42
A well-drafted contract can bind employees’ knowledge and ideas in 
ways that intellectual property regulation cannot.43  Across industries, many 
firms now routinely utilize assignment agreements to gain control over 
intellectual property that is otherwise controlled by individual inventors.44
Given the flexibility of contract law,45 the scope of the innovation 
assignment often is all-encompassing.  Not only do such agreements cover 
employees who are not hired to invent,46 but they define innovations 
broadly.  For example, Google employees sign an assignment agreement 
for “inventions” which is defined to include “inventions, designs, 
developments, ideas, concepts, techniques, devices, discoveries, formulae, 
processes, improvements, writings, records, original works of authorship, 
trademarks, trade secrets, all related know-how, and any other intellectual 
 41.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 790 (defining these controls as “postemployment 
restrictions, including noncompetition contracts, nonsolicitation, nonpoaching, and 
antidealing agreements; collusive do–not–hire talent cartels; pre-invention assignment 
agreements of patents, copyright, as well as nonpatentable and noncopyrightable ideas; and 
nondisclosure agreements, trade secret laws, and economic–espionage prosecution against 
former insiders”). 
 42.  Id.; see also Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource–Based 
Theory to Determine Covenant not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 981-82 (2012) 
(showing how “the employer is attempting to use contractual means to reach beyond the 
normal default bounds of the employment relationship and exert control over the 
postemployment mobility choices and human capital value of the individual, and to do so in 
direct contravention of the employee’s expressed desire for freedom of employment 
mobility”); Sawicki, supra note 10, at 651 (questioning the prevailing explanation of 
acquisition of start-ups in Silicon Valley as evidence of the “cooperative norms” and instead 
noting that “[l]arge technology firms cannot acquire . . . patent rights by simply hiring the 
start-up’s engineers; instead they must buy the start-up itself”). 
 43.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 803 (stating that “[t]he explicit subversion of the lines 
drawn in patent and copyright law in the drafting of assignment agreements is increasingly 
standard”). But see Lemley, supra note 8, at 465 (discussing the idea that IP is 
governmental control of market entry and market prices that subvert the free market).  See
generally Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace by 
Contract Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 351, 364 (2007) (noting how “[a]t first blush, 
the notion of privately contracting over public policy (and arguably around it) might seem in 
tension with some basic tenets of democratic governance.  Private parties, unsatisfied with 
the laws and mechanisms supplied by public law, are writing their own private labor and 
employment laws.  Of course, public law and regulatory mechanisms have long coexisted 
with contractual mechanisms for private ordering, and in effect with private governance 
mechanisms.”).
 44.  Sawicki, supra note 10, at 665 (stating that “[j]oint invention by more than one 
person is possible; corporate invention, however, is not”). 
 45.  DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 735 (noting that flexibility in contract law is a means for 
firms to maintain competitive advantages). 
 46.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 799 (stating that courts allow the inclusion of work done at 
home).
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property, whether or not patentable or registerable under patent, copyright, 
or similar laws.”47  The assignment not only of employees’ inventions and 
designs but also of their ideas and concepts moves well beyond the type of 
creations protected by intellectual property law48 and into a “cognitive 
property thicket.”49
The all-encompassing scope is not limited to content coverage but also 
applies to time frame.  The assignment agreements may require employees 
to give control of even their future ideas and innovation to their employer,50
significantly restricting the future mobility and opportunity of employees.51
Firms create inherent conflicts with their employees through such all-
encompassing assignment agreements.  As Professor Katherine Stone noted 
in describing the “New Psychological Contract” of the American 
workforce, the problem of ownership of human capital is the crux of the 
divide between firms and their agents.52 Fundamentally, employees assume 
that the skills and knowledge they acquire on a particular job ‘belong’ to 
them in the sense that they take these with them when they depart.  
Employers, on the other hand, believe that if they have imparted valuable 
skills or knowledge to their employees, they should ‘own’ that human 
capital, in the sense of being able to ensure that it is utilized on their firm’s 
behalf.53
 47.  Id. at 803. 
 48.  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in Current 
Context, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 897, 904–05 (2015) (asserting that “[p]atents facilitate 
efficient cooperation and collaboration between inventors, commercializers, and adopters by 
serving as a definable, transferable asset, by signaling important information regarding the 
technology and the inventor, by promoting modularity, and by otherwise reducing 
transaction costs”). 
 49.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 791 (discussing that employment restrictions limit hiring of 
talent and of sparking innovation).
 50.  Sawicki, supra note 10, at 666 (explaining that “[i]nvention assignment agreements 
are often not limited to inventions for which patent applications are filed during the course 
of employment; instead, they reach any inventions produced while the employee is at the 
firm”); accord Lobel, supra note 1, at 799 (noting the “common practice of requiring 
employees to forfeit all future innovation . . . effectively restricting them from later pursuing 
independent career paths, notwithstanding the fact that they were not hired to invent”). 
 51.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 799 (noting the restriction regardless of the nature of the 
future employment). 
 52.  Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 525 (2001) 
(explaining that employees receive general knowledge, which they need to travel with them 
in future employment opportunities, from firms); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, Robert C. 
Bird & Jason A. Colquitt, Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 OR. L.
REV. 449, 454 (2011) (offering best practices to “merge the internal (psychological) contract 
with the external (legal) contract to the benefit of both the employer and employee”). 
 53.  Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of 
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 722–23 (2002) (stating 
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Although courts have limited the impact of traditional covenants not 
to compete to protect employees’ pursuits of trade and to promote interests 
in mobility,54 and, in some cases, states do not enforce such agreements,55
neither is true for innovation assignment agreements.  In California, where 
covenants not to compete are unenforceable, assignment agreements are 
enforced.56  Even assignment agreements that extend into the future, such 
as the one signed by a research scientist that gave his employer the right to 
any inventions developed within one year after the employment 
relationship had terminated, are enforced in some states.57  The South 
Carolina Supreme Court upheld a verdict for the employer because 
assignment agreements, “do not operate in restraint of the employee’s trade 
but merely vest ownership of an invention with the entity which ought to 
have it.”58
Professor Lobel emphasizes the ubiquitous nature of such assignment 
agreements by noting that assignment agreements may not only apply to 
future inventions, but also “reach back to an employee’s past”59 and arise 
that the expectations with respect to human capital differ between employees and 
employers). 
 54.  Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants–Not–to–Compete as the Legal 
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 261–64 (2015) (discussing the 
majority enforcement of covenants not to compete when reasonable in light of the context).  
See also Bishara & Orozco, supra note 14, at 990 (explaining that “the reasonableness test 
of a noncompete’s provisions provides a sort of de facto presumption that some restriction is 
warranted, as long as it is within the case–by–case ‘reasonable’ bounds”); Norman D. 
Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from 
Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 288–90 (2006) (adapting a framework based in part upon industry and 
position).
 55.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 16600 (2015) (stating that non-compete 
agreements cannot be enforced). See also Gomulkiewicz, supra note 54, at 264–65.
California’s strong rule against the enforceability of non-competes has been replicated in 
Hawaii, North Dakota, Montana, and Oklahoma although the courts in Montana and 
Oklahoma have interpreted their statutes to permit the enforcement of non-competes in 
certain circumstances.  Although not going as far as California, Colorado and Oregon limit 
enforcement of non-competes to managers and professional workers.  Id. at 265. 
 56.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 2870(a) (2014) (stating that the provision would be against 
public policy). See also Sawicki, supra note 10, at 665 (discussing some limitations “unless 
the invention relates to the employer’s business or results from the employee’s work for the 
employer”).
 57.  Milliken & Co. v. Morin, 731 S.E.2d 288, 288 (S.C. 2012) (holding that the 
agreement is enforceable because it is not too broad); see also Lobel, supra note 1, at 819–
20 (discussing Milliken).
 58.  Milliken, 731 S.E.2d at 292. 
 59.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 814 (referencing the case of Brown v. Alcatel USA, Inc., No. 
05-02-01678-CV, 2004 WL 1434521, at *3 (Tex. App. June 28, 2004), which involves Evan 
Brown, who conceived of an invention before working for Alcatel, based on years of his 
own computer programming experiences that began while he was in college). 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 73 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 73 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
4_MAGID_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/17 7:31 PM
2017] MONETIZE VS. INCENTIVIZE 379 
not only through individual contract but through institutional policy “such 
as a company handbook or an employee manual.”60  This leads him to 
conclude:
Business competitors do not desire to hire individuals obligated 
under such a clause because the work product of such employees 
may not accrue to the new employer’s benefit.  At best, 
employers that hire inventive employees obligated under such 
agreements will under-utilize the employees’ inventive skills so 
as not to develop conflicts with prior trailer clauses.61
II. HEALTH CARE INNOVATION INCENTIVES
Innovation through collaboration is crucial to the health care industry 
as it undergoes a 21st century transformation.  Although regulation is 
certainly a factor in this industry, the challenges that necessitate this 
transformation are the same factors that led to the information revolution in 
many industries: “globalization, technology, and entrepreneurship.”62  In 
this section the health care industry is highlighted because it is an industry 
that is attempting to innovate through integration and consolidation and 
specifically by employing assignment agreements, as utilized by other 
industries, for strategic contracting.  The practice raises the question: does 
this promote collaboration for advancing innovation or constrain human 
capital in a way that limits innovation to the detriment of not only the 
health care industry but also the economy and well-being of the United 
States?
A. Snapshot of the Health Care Industry 
The impact of the health care industry on the economy of the United 
States is impressive.  In 2014, aggregate spending on health care in the 
country represented $3.0 trillion dollars, or 17.5 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP).63  This is the highest percentage of GDP health care 
spending in the world.64  The Health and Human Services Department 
 60.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 815. 
 61.  Id. at 820. 
 62.  DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 734. 
 63.  CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE DATA: NHE FACTSHEET, available at https://www.cms.gov/research-
statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-
sheet.html [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3NMM-WL2J] (“NHE FACTSHEET”).
 64.  Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Holmes, and  Jonathan Skinner, Is This Time 
Different? The Slowdown in Healthcare Spending, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, 2 6 1 – 6 2  (2013),  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/ 
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expects that the health care share of GDP will continue its growth and 
reach 20.1 percent by 2025.65  The spending is distributed 32.1 percent to 
hospital care, 19.9 percent to physician/clinical services, 9.8 percent to 
pharmaceuticals, 22.7 percent to home health care, nursing care, or other 
personal health care, and 15.4 percent to administrative and other health 
care spending.66  Although there was a slowdown in growth of health care 
spending attributed to the recession years, with the growth of per-capita 
health care spending stabilizing at around 3 percent between 2009 and 2012 
in contrast to 5.3 percent growth seen only five years prior, these 
slowdowns may be misleading given the continued growth in health care 
spending over time.67  Even with the slowdown from the recession, national 
health expenditures continue to see growth, with 2014 healthcare spending 
showing a moderate increase of 4.3 percent from the previous year.68  A 
major factor in long-term health care spending growth is innovation in 
technology for new treatments and procedures and diffusion of existing 
technology.69
The health care industry was not always such a robust and dominant 
part of the U.S. economy.  In 1929, it was a mere 3.5 percent of GDP.70  By 
1960 it had risen to 5.1 percent, a third of which was primarily for 
treatment of World War II veterans.71  A period of rapid growth began after 
1966 with the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid.72  Costs tripled 
Fall%202013/2013b_chandra_healthcare_spending.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5ESX-F5FE]. 
 65.  NHE FACTSHEET, supra note 63. 
 66.  Id.; NAT. CTR FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH UNITED STATES, 2015 (2016),
Table 94, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf#093 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3LQJ-DEWF].  Other personal health care includes, for example, dental 
and other professional health services, and durable medical equipment. Other health 
spending includes public health activity, research, and structures and equipment. Id.
 67.  Michael Chernew, Interpreting New Data On Health Care Spending Growth,
HEALTHAFFAIRSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/12/02/interpreting-
new-data-on-health-care-spending-growth/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/22HU-2QCF]; see also
Chandra, supra note 64, at 271 (citing other factors contributing to the slowdown in health 
care spending, including the Affordable Care Act implementation). 
 68.  Andre Chappe, Steven Sheingold, & Nguyen Nbuyen, Heath Care Spending 
Growth and Federal Policy 2, DEPT. HEALTH HUM. SERV., ISSUE BRIEF (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/190471/SpendingGrowth.pdf 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/BMY8-7V8A]; see also Kaiser Family Foundation, Healthcare Costs: A 
Primer 4, Fig. 1, (2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7670-
03.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/S9BJ-LWUK] (hereinafter Health Care Costs: A Primer).
 69.  Health Care Costs: A Primer, supra note 68 at 25.  
 70.  Theodore Caplow, Louis Hicks, and Ben J. Wattenberg, The First Measured 
Century: An Illustrated Guide to Trends in America, 1900–2000 152 (2000).
 71.  Id.
 72.  Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit 
Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 18 (1995).  The Medicare Act provides hospital and medical insurance for the 
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between 1970 and 1997.  In 1980, expenditures comprised 7.9 percent of 
GDP; by 1997, they were 13.5 percent.73
Beginning in 1929, concurrent with the onset of the Great Depression, 
a combination of three factors created a powerful force in the American 
health care system: privatized health care insurance.74  First, due to the lack 
of support of health insurance by the American Medical Association, many 
people, particularly the poor, had little to no access to care.75  Second, 
hospitals faced financial peril as a result of the Great Depression and were 
forced to find new ways to finance their services.76  Third, Baylor 
University Hospital in Dallas, in order to raise revenue, offered a single 
hospital health insurance plan to school teachers in the area.77  Baylor’s 
plan was quickly replicated throughout the struggling hospital industry in 
the United States and by 1933 a number of innovative plans were offered 
by hospitals and related organizations.78
Private health insurance expanded following World War II and 
throughout the Post-War period with accelerating cost increases for health 
care services.79  Despite these increases, attempts in both the legislative and 
executive branches of government to pass major health care reform were 
met with little success.  The changes in Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) during this time are examples of measured responses taken to 
aged and is financed by federal payroll taxes; Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-97, § 102, 79 Stat. 286, 291–332 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1395–1395yy (2012)).  The Medicaid Act provides matching federal funds for state 
medical assistance to the indigent; Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 343–52 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v 
(2012)).
 73.  Caplow, supra note 70, at 152. 
 74.  See Charles D. Weller, “Free Choice” as a Restraint of Trade in American 
Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1360–1362 (1984) 
(discussing the forces that caused a rapid rise in the development of health insurance plans).
 75.  Id. at 1362.  The American Medical Association’s resistance to group health 
insurance eventually resulted in its conviction for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).  See Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) 
(holding the American Medical Association liable under the Sherman Antitrust Act for 
restraining trade). 
 76.  Weller, supra note 74, at 1361. 
 77.  Id. at 1361. 
 78.  Weller, supra note 74, at 1363.  Although not necessarily embraced by all.  See id.
at 1364 (stating that “[t]hese developments, however, were understandably threatening to 
the hospital and medical professions.  They were particularly threatening to a profession 
built on a model of the individual solo practitioner in a period of scientific, social, and 
economic dislocation.”). 
 79.  Crimm, supra note 72, at 15 (explaining that “[a]s hospital and health care 
insurance coverage reached more people, demand for health care accelerated”). 
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address significant health care cost issues.80  The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)81 is the most significant attempt at 
reforming the U.S. health care system since the passage of Social Security 
and Medicare.82  Some of the key effects of this law are the: (1) primary 
individual mandate;83 (2) fundamental changes to the employee and health 
benefit plan market; (3) establishment of state health insurance exchanges; 
and (4) extension of Medicaid coverage.84
B. Hospital Consolidation Prompted by Innovation Costs 
Just as hospitals needed to transform their relationship to financing 
patient care during the Great Depression, now hospitals must adjust to the 
changing health care landscape and increased costs of providing care, 
particularly the costs associated with technology such as innovations in 
new treatments and procedures.85  A number of researchers who have 
examined the growth in health care spending in the United States conclude 
that it is the increased use and diffusion of innovation in treatments and 
procedures that drive cost.86  The rate of use of sophisticated medical 
 80.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.C.A., 
& 42 U.S.C.A.).  These were relatively modest changes compared to the earlier enactments 
of Medicaid and Medicare.  The defeat of President Clinton’s health reform plan is one of 
the notable failures of health care reform during this time.  See Laura D. Hermer, Private
Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 53 (2005) (describing the failure of Clinton’s reform efforts and 
suggesting incremental improvements to the system in place rather than an overhaul 
reform).  
 81.  Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 82.  See Sarah Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 
4 (2011) (noting that “contentiousness seems to be a basic ingredient of social welfare 
legislation”).
 83.  Id. at 11-16 (stating that “the heart of the law is an individual mandate that requires 
‘applicable’ individuals to maintain ‘minimum essential health coverage’ or face certain 
financial penalties”). 
 84.  Id. (referring to these provisions as the “four pillars” of the ACA).  It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to discuss the ACA in depth.  Rather, this chapter adopts an 
agnostic approach to the law, characterizing its major changes to health care law as part 
of the historical evolution of health care in the United States that offers opportunities as 
well as challenges for those in the health care industry.  For a discussion of the “bitter 
reception” of the ACA and the political aspects of its passage and implementation.  See
id. at 4–10.  
 85.  Chandra, supra note 64, at 284–85. 
 86.  Joseph Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 3–21 (1992); Chandra, supra note 64, at 285.  
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procedures in the United States outpaces the rate of use in all other 
countries.87
Such pervasive use of innovation in health care is associated with 
procedures of all kinds.  For example, proton beam accelerators are used to 
treat prostate cancer patients and were projected to double in number 
between 2010 and 2014.88  The cost of installation for each accelerator, 
however, is hundreds of millions of dollars.89  Even for technology that 
costs less for each item, such as cardiac stents to treat heart disease, if the 
use of the technology becomes the norm for a large number of patients, the 
impact on the cost of health care spending is significant.  In the 1990s, the 
typical treatment for blockage in arteries was angioplasty, a balloon 
threaded into the artery and then expanded at the site of the blockage.90
Later, cardiologists routinely utilized stents or multiple stents to widen 
narrow arteries.91  During the mid-2000s, several research trials questioned 
the benefits of cardiac stents in the treatment of the most common type of 
heart disease.  This led to a decline in the use of cardiac stents that 
impacted health care spending in both Medicare and the private insurance 
market, and contributed to an overall decline in health care spending 
around 2004.92
Innovation in treatment and procedures and, more generally, the use of 
technology and technical equipment impacts the cost of health care overall.  
In response to the increased costs of providing care, as well as the decline 
in hospital use, hospitals are consolidating at a rapid pace.93  This 
consolidation, in turn, may result in increasing consumer health care costs 
all the more.94  Therefore, innovation in health care has the potential for 
broad patient benefits but also negative cost impact.  The implications for 
 87.  Joseph Newhouse, An Iconoclastic View of Health Cost Containment, 1 2  
H E A L T H A F F . 152, 152–171 (1993); Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., Cross-National 
Comparisons of Health Systems Using OECD Data, 1999, 2 1  H E A L T H A F F .  1 6 9 ,  
169–182 (2002); Richard Rettig, Medical Innovation Duels Cost Containment, 1 3  
H E A L T H A F F .  7 ,  7–28 (1994).  
 88.  Chandra, supra note 64, at 286. 
 89.  Id.
 90.  Id. at 279. 
 91.  Id.
 92.  Id.
 93.  David M. Cutler &  Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share and 
Consolidation, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1964 (2013).  The authors note that many factors 
contribute to the consolidation trend, including the decline in hospital use.  Between 1981 
and 2011, hospital use as measured by inpatient days at short term acute hospitals 
declined by 33 percent despite the increase in population overall and the aging of the 
population.  Coincident with the decline in number of days in hospitals, 15 percent of 
hospitals closed.  Id. at 1965. 
 94.  Id.
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innovation in the changing health care landscape require the industry to 
pursue innovation not just with an eye toward monetizing intellectual 
property, but also toward transforming the industry to improve each 
hospital’s value chain.95
The hospital mergers that have become commonplace over the past 
decade not only reflect trends in innovation96 but, in an effort to improve 
value chains, the mergers establish new employment relationships between 
hospitals and the physicians and health care practitioners who work there.  
With the implementation of the ACA, industry experts anticipate that 
consolidation will increase.97  Because the industry is seeing both 
horizontal consolidation and vertical consolidation,98 there are important 
consequences to employment relationships in the health care industry.  
Moreover, many health systems now engage hospital employees in the 
process of innovation through academic medical centers.99  Often, hospitals 
now consist of a system built around one or more academic medical centers 
with community or short term acute centers supporting the academic 
medical center.100
Horizontal consolidation, or hospitals merging or acquiring other 
hospitals, typically results in hospitals becoming part of a health system.  
From 2007 to 2012, 432 hospital mergers and acquisitions were announced 
involving 835 hospitals, were announced.101  Sixty percent of hospitals are 
now part of health systems, which is an increase of seven percent in a 
decade.102  In theory, the consolidation should result in cost savings for a 
hospital, but empirical studies show mixed results.103  Often times, a larger 
hospital system with a flagship academic medical center has the market 
power to increase prices for medical procedures and hospital stays and, 
thus, fails to incorporate the full integration of the system that would lead 
to lower health care costs for consumers.104
 95.  See Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and 
Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 604–05 (2010) (discussing the role of law in strategic value 
chains).
 96.  Birkinshaw, supra note 12, at 43. 
 97.  Cutler & Morton, supra note 93, at 1965. 
 98.  Id.
 99.  See infra Part IV (discussing ways in which hospitals attempt to claim physician 
innovation).
 100.  Cutler & Morton, supra note 93, at 1964. 
 101.  See generally CENTER FOR HEALTHCARE ECONOMICS AND POLICY, HOSPITAL
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (2013), available at http://www.aha.org/research/policy/ 
2013.shtml [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/NT2U-22NQ] (providing access to 2013 policy research 
papers focused on hospital and mergers).  
 102.  Cutler & Morton, supra note 93, at 1965. 
 103.  Id. at 1967. 
 104.  Id. (noting that “flagship academic medical centers offering perceived higher 
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Vertical consolidation within the health care industry has led to a 
marked increase in hospital ownership of physician practices.  Data from 
the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) surveys showed 
that the percentage of physicians working in practices owned by a hospital 
or integrated delivery system increased from 24 percent in 2004 to 40 
percent in 2011.105  Although the American Medical Association takes issue 
with data suggesting that close to 60 percent of physicians are now 
employed by hospitals,106 there is no dispute that the trend is toward fewer 
physician-owned practices and more physicians employed by hospitals than 
ever before.107  Just as in other industries that adopt an “everybody 
innovates” approach,108 many hospitals hope that their newly acquired 
physician employees are the source of future innovation in health care that 
will offset the decrease in government payments under the ACA.109  For 
example, a 2012 survey by the American College of Cardiology showed 
that the percentage of cardiologists employed by hospitals rose from 11 
percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2012.110
quality care often wield enormous market power . . . a patient who has a serious illness and 
also is well insured will seek out these hospitals with little regard for price”). 
 105.  Carol K. Kane & David W. Emmons, New Data on Physician Practice 
Arrangements: Private Practice Remains Strong Despite Shifts Toward Hospital 
Employment, POL’Y RES. PERSP. 1, 1 (2013), http://www.nmms.org/sites/default/files/ 
images/2013_9_23_ama_survey_prp-physician-practice-arrangements.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/Z4Z6-VBY3]. 
 106.  Donna Marbury, AMA Says the Physician Exodus to Hospitals Overrated, MED.
ECON. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/news/ama-says-physician-exodus-hospitals-overrated? 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/GVQ8-YCDR]. 
 107.  Id. (citing a report by the American Hospital Association w h ich  s t a t ed  t ha t  
the num ber  o f  physicians employed by community hospitals increased by 32 percent 
between 2000 and 2012.  It also cited a survey conducted by Accenture w h ich  
concluded that only 36 percent of physicians would work at independent practices by the
end of 2013.).  See also Abby Goodnough, New Law’s Demands on Doctors Have Many 
Seeking a Network, N .Y. T I M E S , at A1 (Mar. 3, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/us/new-laws-demands-on-doctors-have-many-seeking-
a-network.html?_r=0 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/H2Z9-S5M6]. 
 108.  Birkinshaw, supra note 12, at 43. 
 109.  Max Nisen, Hospitals Could Create the Next Big Wave of Healthcare Tech and 
Startups, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/innovation-
coming-from-hospitals-2013-1 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/U7FS-66BA]. 
 110.  Am. Coll. of Cardiology, P r e s s  R e l e a s e :  New American College of 
Cardiology Practice Census Shows Continued Trend Towards Hospital Integration (Sept. 
10, 2012), a v a i l a b l e  a t  www.cardiosource.org/News-Media/Media-Center/News-
Releases/2012/09/Leg-Conf.aspx) [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/8NN8-9QW4]. 
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III. PROTECTING THE INVESTMENT IN HEALTH CARE INNOVATION
The Bayh-Dole Act111 is known as “innovation’s golden goose.”112
Prior to the Act, the patent laws of the United States, designed with an 
individual inventor in mind,113 did not address the issue of the ownership of 
inventions that were created as part of employment.114  Indeed, the U.S. 
Constitution provides that protecting inventors is the best way to promote 
progress in science and useful arts.115  Despite changes in the patent laws 
over time, the individual inventor, whether Henry Ford or Bill Gates, remains 
an important part of the American identity.116  The administration of patent 
law also impacted this cultural perception.117
A. Statutory Protections 
The most significant patent law reform in more than 50 years118 is the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).119  The AIA changed the United 
States from a “first-to-invent” country to a “first-to-file” country,120 thereby 
 111.  Pub. L. No. 96–517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§200–212 (2012)). 
 112.  Opinion, Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST ( Dec. 12, 2002), 
www.economist.com/node/1476653 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3CJ9-AV4L]. 
 113.  Richard A. Kamprath, Patent Reversion: An Employee-Inventor’s Second Bite at 
the Apple, 11 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 186, 189 (2012).
 114.  Toshiko Takenaka, Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership Under the 
Bayh-Dole Act in Stanford v. Roche: Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle in the 
German Employee Invention Act, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 281, 284 (2012).
 115.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (stating that “Congress shall have power .  .  .  to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”). 
 116.  Kamprath, supra note 113, at 190 (noting that “[o]ur society has long recognized 
the intensely personal nature of an invention and the importance of providing 
stimulation and encouragement to inventors”). 
 117.  Fisk, supra note 40, at 1198 (discussing the change in “cultural perception of 
invention from inventor-hero to Bell Labs” came about slowly, in part, because of the 
“Patent Office’s bureaucratic insistence on the existence of an individual inventor no doubt 
influenced the way that employers and employees perceived who had been the inventor in 
fact”).
 118.  Alexa L. Ashworth, Race to the Patent Office! How the New Patent Reform Act 
will Affect Technology Transfer at Universities, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 383, 385 
(2013).
 119.  Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–375). 
 120.  Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3, 125 Stat 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102). 
The section provides, in relevant part: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless - (1) the claimed invention was
patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention; or 
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aligning U.S. patent law with most other patent systems throughout the 
world.121  This change was widely discussed and aroused controversy in the 
intellectual property community because it is perceived to favor larger 
corporations and well-financed entities over the individual inventor.122  The 
end of the cultural primacy of the individual inventor in innovation seems 
complete.123  The concern with the change to “first-to-file” is that 
corporations will quickly file patent applications to out-race the individual 
inventor.124
The change to a first-to-file system, taken in context with reduced filing 
fees for small and micro entities,125 represents Congress’ attempt to strike a 
balance that would protect intellectual property assets that are increasingly 
important to the domestic economy, while creating more opportunities in the 
global economy.126  However, if Steve Jobs is correct that it is not money that 
is required for innovation but rather well-managed people “who get it,”127
proper incentives and motivation to invent might still  might be lacking. 
The Bayh-Dole Act is a prime example of statutory changes that can 
spark interest in the investment and commercialization of technology.  In the 
1970s, there was growing concern that the era of American inventiveness, 
propelled by necessity during World War II, was over.128  Production and 
investment in technology by U.S. corporations fell behind other countries, 
(2) the claimed invention was described .  .  .  under section 122(b), in which 
the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and 
was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. 
Id.
 121.  Ashworth, supra note 118, at 395. 
 122.  See, e.g., Kamprath, supra note 113, at note 5 (noting “[t]his system favors those 
entities that can dedicate fiscal resources and personnel solely to creating patent 
application as fast as possible. Competing against large corporations and universities, 
America may well see the death of the individual inventor”).
 123.  Fisk, supra note 40, at 1198 (discussing the transformation from inventing as a 
singular act to a collaborative task).  
 124.  Will The New Patent Laws Help or Hurt Small Businesses?, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS
(Feb. 8, 2012), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/will-the-new-patent-laws-help-or-
hurt-small-businesses/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/C8HE-NY9P]. 
 125.  Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 31620 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
123).
 126.  Ashworth, supra note 118, at 395. 
 127.  David Kirkpatrick, The Second Coming of Apple, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 1998), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/11/09/250834 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/95CU-92J2] (discussing how Steve Jobs described the process of 
innovation as “[i]nnovation has nothing to do with how many R&D dollars you have . . . . 
It’s not about money. It’s about the people you have, how you’re led, and how much you get 
it.”).
 128.  Parker Tresemer, Best Practices for Drafting University Technology Assignment 
Agreements After Filmtec, Stanford v. Roche, and Patent Reform, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 347, 349 (2012).
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most notably Japan.129  In 1980, Senators Bob Dole and Birch Bayh drafted 
the University and Small Business Procedures Act (commonly known as the 
Bayh-Dole Act) to “promote the utilization of inventions arising from 
federally supported research,” “promote collaboration between commercial 
and non-profit organizations,” and “ensure that the Government maintains 
sufficient rights in any supported inventions.”130
To achieve its goals, the Bayh-Dole Act focused on federal funding 
agreements and the patentable products derived from research conducted 
under those funding agreements.131  Universities and academic medical 
centers that participate in federally funded research were given incentives to 
collaborate with businesses and become involved in monetizing intellectual 
property to the financial benefit of the institutions.  The institutions retained 
royalties derived from federally-funded research as long as any royalties 
were “utilized for the support of scientific research or education.”132  The Act 
does not grant the research institution complete rights to patentable products 
but, instead, establishes a hierarchical system that determines what entity or 
person has the right to retain title in the inventions produced from federal 
funding.133
The first opportunity to retain title to federally-funded inventions 
developed by small businesses or not-for-profits belongs to those federal 
contractor organizations themselves.134  If the federal contractor chooses not 
to retain title to the inventions, the federal government is next in line to take 
title to the inventions.135  If the federal government also passes on the 
opportunity to retain title to inventions produced from the federal funding 
agreement, the individual employee-inventor working for the federal 
contractor has the right to sole title.136
If the federal contractor retains the rights to an invention, it commits to 
several key obligations including:  reporting all “subject inventions,”137
 129.  Id.
 130.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192-2193.
 131.  35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).  
 132.  37 C.F.R. § 401.14 (2013). 
 133.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2193. See also Stephen T. Black, Psst! Wanna Buy a 
Bridge? IP Transfers of Non–Existent Property, 31 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 523, 531 (explaining 
that “[t]he Bayh-Dole Act was designed to free up federally funded research so that it could 
be more readily moved into the marketplace. The Act reinforced the concept that the 
inventor owns the patent, regardless of what funds or resources the inventor used in 
reducing the patent to practice or in researching the underlying science.”). 
 134.  35 U.S.C. § 202 (2013).  
 135.  See id.
 136.  See id. at § 203. 
 137.  Id. a t  § 201(e) (stating “[t]he term ‘subject invention’ means any invention of 
the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work 
under a funding agreement  . . .”).  
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taking reasonable efforts to commercialize the invention through patenting or 
licensing, and granting the federal government a license to the subject 
invention.138
Medical researchers and the biotech industry are among those that laud 
the Bayh-Dole Act for its achievements in advancing biomedical research.  
One National Institute of Health (NIH) Report from 2001 stated: “Federally 
funded biomedical research, aided by the economic incentives of Bayh-Dole, 
has created the scientific capital of knowledge that fuels medical and 
biotechnology development.”139  Indeed, federal contractor start-up 
companies created the entire biotechnology industry.140  Although there are a 
few notable exceptions,141 monetizing the inventions has proven to be a 
bigger challenge for the federal contractors involved in the federally-funded 
research, including academic medical centers.  Technology transfer activity, 
such as invention disclosures, patent applications, patent issuances, and 
licenses, increased steadily following passage of the Act;142 however, the 
activity, more often than not, is a financial drain on academic centers rather 
than income generating.143  In 2006, 52 percent of U.S. institutions spent 
more on technology transfer than the income generated from the activity.144
The difficulty with bringing patentable products to market and 
monetizing research to the financial benefit of the institution is not a failure 
of academic medical centers or universities uniquely.  Research studies 
reveal that the difficulty with innovation is not the “good idea” but moving 
the idea through the process to revenue generation.145  Effective restrictive 
covenants in contracts that the health care industry now utilizes extensively 
 138.  Tresemer, supra note 128, at 357–58. 
 139.  NIH REPORT, A PLAN TO ENSURE TAXPAYERS’ INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED
(2001), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/ 
wydenrpt.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/AN77-MDSN]. 
 140.  Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 30 SCI. TRANSL.
MED. 52, 52 (2010).
 141.  Richard Perez-Pena, Patenting Their Discoveries Does not Pay Off for Most 
Universities, a Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/education/patenting-their-discoveries-does-not-pay-
off-for-most-universities-a-study-says.html [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/ZX5X-PD3T] (noting that 
Columbia University received $790 million in revenue from patents involving inserting 
DNA into cells and New York University received more than $1 billion for a patent that led 
to an autoimmune drug). 
 142.  Jay P. Kesan, Economic Rationales for the Patent System in Current Context, 22 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 897, 905 (2015) (noting that “following the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, universities did not necessarily produce more or better research, but began patenting 
and licensing at far greater rates”). 
 143.  Loise, supra note 140, at 52. 
 144.  Id.
 145.  Birkinshaw, supra note 12, at 44 (referring to the “eureka myth” that a single 
moment of insight is required to create innovation). 
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to secure intellectual property may help protect that “good idea” but little 
else.146  These restrictive covenants alone cannot motivate innovation as a 
process.147
B. Stanford v. Roche Interprets the Bayh-Dole Act 
A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision challenged long-held 
interpretations of the Bayh-Dole Act and federal contractors’ ability to secure 
intellectual property.  Many commentators view the decision as tipping the 
delicate balance in the system of incentives created by the Bayh-Dole Act for 
federal contractors and private industry.148  In Stanford v. Roche, the Court 
held that the Bayh-Dole Act does not automatically grant title in intellectual 
property to federal contractors nor does it give federal contractors the right to 
take title to such property unilaterally.149  The invention at issue in the case 
was Roche’s HIV test kits that are used widely in hospitals and medical 
clinics around the world.150  The facts of the case provide an interesting 
example of the process of commercializing technology in the health care 
industry.
The HIV test kits marketed by Roche began development at a small 
California research company, Cetus. Previously, Cetus had developed a 
Nobel Prize winning technique, polymerase chain reaction, known as PCR.151
Using this technique, Cetus sought methods for quantifying blood-borne 
levels of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS.  In 1988, Cetus started 
collaborating with researchers at Stanford University to test the efficacy of 
new AIDS drugs.152  Dr. Mark Holodniy worked as a researcher at Stanford.  
When he began working there he signed an employment contract that 
included a “Copyright and Patent Agreement.”  Under the terms of that 
agreement, Holodniy agreed to assign to Stanford his “right, title and interest 
 146.  Lemley, supra note 8, at 504 (stating that “[t]he IP laws were created in a world of 
scarcity.  They sought to take ideas that were public goods - things that by their nature were 
not scarce - and artificially make them scarce by designating them as owned by someone.”). 
 147.  Birkinshaw, supra note 12, at 44.
 148.  See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, The Unintended Consequences of Stanford v. Roche, 39 
AIPLA Q. J. 335, 336 (2011) (noting that (under the Stanford decision) employee-inventor 
could defeat an employer’s expectancy contract interest in an invention. . . by filing a patent 
application in his or her own name and assigning the patent application to a third party.  
This gaping loophole in patent law could put tens of billions of dollars of patent ownership 
rights at risk); Takenaka, supra note 114 , at 288 (discussing how “[e]ven though basic 
policies and objectives were expressly set out in the Bayh-Dole Act, they played no role 
in [the Court’s] interpretation”).  
 149.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2190. 
 150.  Id. at 2192. 
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id.
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in” inventions created while employed there.153
Holodniy became interested in using the PCR technique to quantify 
HIV levels in patient blood samples.  To learn more about PCR, he was 
permitted to conduct research at Cetus after signing a “Visitor’s 
Confidentiality Agreement.”154  The agreement stated that Holodniy “will 
assign and do[es] hereby assign” to Cetus his “right, title and interest in each 
of the ideas, inventions and improvements” made as a result of having access 
to Cetus.155  Holodniy’s work with Cetus is an example of the collaboration 
between business and academic medical center research that the Bayh-Dole 
Act encouraged. 
Holodniy conducted research at Cetus for nine months and, during that 
time, devised a PCR-based procedure for quantifying the amount of HIV in a 
blood sample.  He returned to Stanford to test the HIV measurement 
technique with his colleagues.  Stanford eventually obtained three patents 
related to the HIV measurement process after securing written assignment of 
rights from all Stanford employees involved in the research, including 
Holodniy.156  Holodniy’s Copyright and Patent Agreement with Stanford 
signed at the time of his employment required that he assign his rights in any 
intellectual property to Stanford. 
In 1991, Roche Molecular Systems purchased all of Cetus’ PCR-related 
assets, including the intellectual property rights that Cetus obtained through 
agreements, such as the one signed by Holodniy.  After testing, Roche 
commercialized the HIV quantification technique by selling HIV test kits.157
In 2005, Stanford filed suit against Roche contending that the HIV test kits 
violated the patents Stanford had obtained on the HIV measurement 
process.158  Roche responded that it was co-owner of the HIV measurement 
process because the Visitor Confidentiality Agreement signed by Holodniy 
assigned his rights to the process to Cetus and later Roche when it purchased 
the assignment of rights.  Stanford, however, asserted that Holodniy had no 
rights to assign through the Visitor Confidentiality Agreement because 
Stanford had superior rights over Holodniy as a federal contractor.159
Stanford reasoned that, because Holodniy’s research was, in part, federally 
funded through an NIH grant, it was subject to the Bayh-Dole Act.  Under 
 153.  Id.
 154.  Id.
 155.  Id.
 156.  Id.
 157.  Id.
 158.  Id. at 2194. 
 159.  See Lobel supra note 1, at 816 (noting that “[i]n the backdrop of the new cognitive 
property, it should not be surprising that the dispute over invention ownership in this case 
was between two institutions, Cetus and Stanford, while the inventor had long been stripped 
of any claims to his invention”). 
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the Act, Stanford believed that it had superior ownership rights, as first in 
line to acquire title, over the inventor himself who is last in line under the 
Bayh-Dole Act.160
Justice Roberts, writing on behalf of the Court, took exception to the 
idea that the inventor was the last in line to claim any rights to his own 
invention, believing such an interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act turned 
patent law on its head.161  The Court began its opinion by noting that, “[s]ince 
1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention 
belong to the inventor.”162  The Bayh-Dole Act, the Court concluded, did not 
violate that basic premise of patent law.163  Congress was obligated to state 
its intention to change the fundamental rights of the inventor under patent 
law expressly if that, indeed, was its intention when creating the Bayh-Dole 
Act.164  Instead of moving the inventor to the back of the line in priority to 
rights in an invention,165 the Bayh-Dole Act, the Court determined, focused 
on rights between the federal contractor and the federal government only 
after the federal contractor obtained sole rights to the invention from the 
inventor.166
The Copyright and Patent Agreement that Holodniy signed upon his 
employment with Stanford University provided that he would assign rights to 
Stanford for inventions created during his employment there.167  Before 
Stanford filed patent applications for the HIV measurement technique, it had 
obtained Holodniy’s assignment of rights as well as the assignment from 
others involved in the research.168  However, the Visitor Confidentiality 
Agreement that Holodniy signed before beginning work at Cetus happened 
 160.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
 161.  Id. at 2199.  See also Lobel, supra note 1, at 816 (characterizing Stanford v. Roche
as a dispute based on the wording of two competing agreements and noting the “key issue in 
the case was the interpretation of the phrase ‘do hereby assign,’ which is commonly used in 
employment pre-invention assignment agreements”). 
 162.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
 163.  Id. at 2199. 
 164.  Id. at 2195 (explaining that in the past, Congress has excluded inventors from 
patent rights, including certain contracts dealing with nuclear material and atomic 
energy.  “Congress provided that title to such inventions ‘shall be vested in, and be the 
property of, the [Atomic Energy] Commission.’”).  
 165.  Id. at 2194 (the District Court held that “ the Bayh-Dole Act ‘provides that the 
individual inventor may obtain title’ to a federally funded invention ‘only after the 
government and the contracting party have declined to do so”).  
 166.  Id. at 2198 (“The Bayh-Dole Act expressly confers on contractors the right to 
challenge a Government-imposed impediment to retaining title to a subject invention .  .  .  
[T]here is no need to protect inventor or third-party rights, because the only rights at 
issue are those of the contractor and the Government.”). 
 167.  Id at 2192 (the Copyright and Patent Agreement provided that Holodniy agreed 
to assign “right, title and interest in” inventions created while employed there).  
 168.  Id. at 2194. 
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before Stanford obtained its assignment of rights.  Therefore, the assignment 
of rights that Cetus obtained occurred while Holodniy retained full rights in 
his research.169  In that way, Cetus received a full assignment of rights to the 
patentable technology while Stanford had a future promise to assign rights.  
The Court held that the Bayh-Dole Act did not change inventors’ rights 
under patent law nor did it change principles of contract law.  Stanford failed 
to obtain the proper assignment of rights and its status as a federal contractor 
did not provide superior rights in the research.170
Stanford v. Roche, in some respects, simply reinforced the importance 
of careful contracting to secure fully the employee assignment agreement in 
federally funded research.171  The Court noted that NIH guidelines made it 
clear to federal contractors that not all aspects of intellectual property are 
controlled under the Bayh-Dole Act.172  In essence, federally funded research 
is on an equal footing with innovation provided by employees to any 
organization and monetizing that innovation requires careful assignment 
agreements.173
Another perspective on Stanford v. Roche is one that goes well beyond 
contracts.174  The ruling underscores the law’s recognition that innovation by 
employees is unique.175  The Court rejected the notion that employers treat 
 169.  Id. at 2192 (the Visitor Confidentiality Agreement provided that Holodniy “‘will 
assign and do[es] hereby assign’ to Cetus his ‘right, title and interest in each of the 
ideas, inventions and improvements’” made as a result of having access to Cetus).  
 170.  Id. at 2199 (“With an effective assignment, those inventions—if federally 
funded—become ‘subject inventions’ under the Act, and the statute as a practical matter 
works pretty much the way Stanford says it should.”). 
 171.  Parker Tresemer, Best Practices for Drafting University Technology Assignment 
Agreements After FilmTec, Stanford v. Roche, and Patent Reform, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 347, 347 (2012), available at https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/best-practices-
for-drafting-university-technology-assignment-agreements [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/FJ5M-ZZD5] 
(“Although much remains unclear in the wake of .  .  .  Stanford v. Roche, the need for 
airtight employee assignment agreements has become glaringly apparent.”).
 172.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2199 (“In guidance documents made available to 
contractors, NIH has made clear that ‘[b]y law, an inventor has initial ownership of an 
invention’ and that contractors should therefore ‘have in place employee agreements 
requiring an inventor to “assign” or give ownership of an invention to the organization 
upon acceptance of Federal funds.’”). 
 173.  Takenaka, supra note 114 , at 285 (“[M]any federal funded inventions will fall 
outside of the Bayh-Dole Act if contractors fail to execute written assignments with 
inventors.”).
 174.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 133, at 530 (noting that “[a]bsent the tinkering of the 
Supreme Court in Stanford, Roche would have lost, by application of the doctrine of ‘he 
who was first in time was first in right’”). 
 175.  Id. at 531 (“In the U.S. IP system, we accord first rights to an inventor, even if that 
person is employed by an entity that provides him or her with the means to invent.”).  But
see, e.g., Fisk, supra note 40, at 1198 (tracing the change in the employee-inventor system 
to favor employer rights). 
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innovation as just another duty of employment.  The concept that employers 
own what employees produce is clear.  The Court conceded that “[n]o one 
would claim that an autoworker who builds a car while working in a factory 
owns that car.”176  The Court saw an important distinction when the 
employee is creating a patentable invention for a federal contractor, 
however.177  The right of inventors to their inventions is “one of the 
fundamental precepts of patent law,” according to the Court, and the Bayh-
Dole Act did not change that.178  This perspective is important in the context 
of innovation in health care assignment agreements but the decision has 
provided impetus for ever expanding assignment agreements to secure 
intellectual property rights for firms, including health care systems. 
IV. INNOVATION ENCUMBERED BY CONTRACT LAW
A. Hospital Systems Claim Rights to Physician Innovation 
Whereas the guiding belief of intellectual property rights is that 
“encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors,”179
contract law is the means for businesses to gain control of intellectual 
property.180  Invention assignment agreements are not the only — or 
necessarily the most ubiquitous — post-employment restrictions utilized 
across industries as the value of intellectual property assets increase. 
Although common law default rules permit, in some cases, an employer 
to obtain a “shop right” or a non-exclusive license to use the inventions of an 
employee, these common law rules are state-law based and are poorly 
defined generally.181  This uncertainty underscores the value to employers of 
assignment contracts.  Well-created assignment agreements include a broad 
scope in both content and time frame.182  As the facts of Stanford v. Roche 
illuminate, however, pre-invention agreements do not guarantee employer 
 176.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2196 .  
 177.  Id. (“But, as noted, patent law has always been different: We have rejected the 
idea that mere employment is sufficient to vest title to an employee’s invention in the 
employer.”). 
 178.  Id. at 2198 (“It would be noteworthy enough for Congress to supplant one of the 
fundamental precepts of patent law and deprive inventors of rights in their own inventions.  
To do so under such unusual terms would be truly surprising.”). 
 179.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 180.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 813 (“The real devil is in contract law.”). 
 181.  Howell, supra note 11, at 86 (characterizing the doctrine of “shop right” as 
“disorderly”). 
 182.  See supra Part I.B (discussing the theory of constrained human capital resulting 
from contracts for innovation). 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 81 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 81 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
4_MAGID_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/17 7:31 PM
2017] MONETIZE VS. INCENTIVIZE 395 
ownership of an invention given the fundamental precepts of patent law 
granting unique status to inventors and the collaborative nature of research in 
the medical field.183  To date, few cases address the enforceability of these 
agreements in the health system setting.  However, as assignment agreements 
become more ubiquitous in these organizations, particularly as hospitals 
consolidate to form ever larger health care systems with a focus on 
innovation,184 these assignment agreements will receive closer scrutiny. 
In a recent case, Grocela v. General Hospital Corp.,185 Dr. Grocela 
challenged the Intellectual Property Policy (Policy) of his employer, 
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) as “an unreasonable, oppressive and 
unduly harsh restraint on trade.”186  Under the Policy, and as a condition of 
his biennial application for reappointment as a clinical staff physician with a 
surgical specialty in urology, Grocela, and all staff physicians, certified that 
the ownership and disposition of inventions and other intellectual property 
created during the time of appointment to the professional staff were 
determined by the Policy.187  The Policy granted ownership rights to MGH of 
all staff inventions “that arise out of or relate to the clinical, research, 
educational or other activities of the Inventor.”188
Importantly, Grocela’s assignment agreement was not a separately 
negotiated contract or even signed as part of the hiring process.189  Instead, 
the assignment agreement was part of MGH’s intellectual property policies 
to which physicians were bound as part of the biennial reappointment 
process.190  The state courts repeatedly have found that health care systems’ 
intellectual property policies, including broad assignment agreements, bind 
 183.  See supra Part III.B (discussing the facts of Stanford v. Roche). 
 184.  See Bob Herman, A  Public-Private Enterprise: Why Intellectual Property is a 
Mainstay of Academic Hospitals, BECKER’S HOSP. CFO (June 28, 2013),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/a-public-private-enterprise-why-intellectual-
property-is-a-mainstay-at-academic-hospitals.html [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/TEK8-28CV] 
(noting that “[m]ost medical centers that are affiliated with universities have a 
technology transfer or commercialization office, and according to the Association of 
University Technology Managers, there are several dozen academic medical centers and 
health systems with such an office”). 
 185.  Grocela v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No. 120459, (2012 Mass. Super.) LEXIS 206 
(Mass. Super. July 12, 2012). 
 186.  Id. at *3.
 187.  Id. at *1. 
 188.  Id.  Cf. Lobel, supra note 1, at 810 (describing Google’s assignment agreement 
defining “inventions”). 
 189.  Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206, at *1. 
 190.  Id.; see also Brown v. Alcatel USA, Inc., No. 05-02-01678-CV, 2004 WL 
1434521, at *2 (Tex. App. June 28, 2004) (deeming an assignment agreement signed as a 
condition of employment was enforceable because “the continued employment and payment 
of salary, which would not have occurred but for Brown signing the employment agreement, 
was [the employer’s] performance under the unilateral contract”). 
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individual health care providers, such as physicians.191  The courts held that 
inclusion of assignment agreements in general policy documents meant “the 
individual expressly agreed to be bound.”192
The Research Ventures and Licensing Department at MGH 
administered the Policy concerning invention ownership.  This department 
received disclosures about inventions created by staff physicians and, after 
determining ownership of the invention, decided whether to pursue patents or 
partners to market the invention.  The department could decide to return 
ownership rights to the inventor and forego the opportunity to patent or 
market the invention.193  Grocela participated in this process during his 
employment with MGH, disclosing at least nine inventions.194  Three of the 
inventions disclosed by Grocela to MGH later reverted back to ownership by 
Grocela when, at his request, MGH assigned its interests back to him.195
In 2011, Grocela entered into an agreement to partner with Grindstone 
Medical to raise investment capital to develop and market his inventions and 
any future inventions not owned by MGH.196  In 2012, Grocela created the 
“voice box invention” outside of the hospital, on his own time and at his own 
expense.197  Although the voice box invention “utilizes or incorporates 
knowledge” that he gained as a physician at MGH, as stated in the Policy, 
Grocela objected to being restricted from creating his own business around 
an invention concerning voice phonating by virtue of his work as a surgeon 
with a specialty in urology.198
Grocela argued before the Massachusetts court that MGH’s ownership 
of inventions under its Policy should be limited to inventions related to his 
specialty of urology.  To read the Policy broadly to extend to all inventions 
whether connected to the work he is employed to perform or not, he 
reasoned, “bars [him] from ordinary competition and thus is contrary to 
public interest, which favors a person’s right to carry on a trade freely.”199
The court rejected Grocela’s claim, finding instead that he was aware 
 191.  Charest v. President of Harvard Coll., No. 13-11556-DPW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18493, at *32 n.4 (D. Mass. Feb. 16. 2016) (“On more than one occasion, Massachusetts 
courts have found that an institution’s intellectual property policies are binding on 
individual employees as signatories.”) (citing Greene v. Ablon, No. 09-20937-DJC, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131958 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2012) and Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 206).  The court fails to note that all of these cases involved physician employees in 
health care systems.
 192.  Charest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18493, *32 n. 4. 
 193.  Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206, at *1. 
 194.  Id.
 195.  Id. at *2. 
 196.  Id.
 197.  Id.
 198.  Id.
 199.  Id. at *3. 
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that his employer contemplated the discovery of inventions as part of his 
employment.  Therefore, even if the inventions were created outside of 
employment, they were within the scope of his employment.200  The court 
found that the hospital had a compelling interest in promoting the free 
sharing of staff inventions to benefit the patient population served by 
MGH.201  What the court does not address, or seem to understand is a 
concern for individual employees, was that Grocela was not hired to invent 
or research, but to treat patients.202
Grocela, the court reasoned, received adequate compensation for 
discoveries because “[a]s a member of the staff, he reaps the benefit of the 
clinical resources, office space, access to doctor-patient relationships and 
professional prestige available to a physician who practices at one of this 
country’s major teaching hospitals.”203  But is that adequate incentive for 
innovation generated, not from work in the physician’s practice area, and for 
which Grocela benefitted the hospital by serving patients within his 
specialty?204
Courts generally interpret assignment agreement disputes in favor of 
employers.205  State statutes carve out some exceptions to the enforcement of 
assignment agreements, particularly in instances, such as the case in Grocela,
where the invention takes place outside the place of employment and without 
employer resources.206  Statutes in seven states create limitations to invention 
assignment clauses.207  These statutes are generally modeled after 
 200.  Id. at *4 (citing National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 247 (1944)).  
 201.  Id. at *5. 
 202.  See Lobel, supra note 1, at 799 (discussing how “[e]ven more generally, the sense 
of wrong may come from the common practice of requiring employees to forfeit all future 
innovation through assignment agreements, effectively restricting them from later pursuing 
independent career paths, notwithstanding the fact that they were not hired to invent”). Cf. 
Birkinshaw, supra note 12, at 43 (advocating for an approach that firm innovation should 
involve all employees) with Stone, supra note 52, at 525 (identifying the tension between 
employees and employers as a fundamental different view of who “owns” knowledge 
acquired at work). 
 203.  Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206, at *5. 
 204.  See, e.g., Brown v. Alcatel USA, Inc., No. 05-02-01678-CV, 2004 WL 1434521, at 
2 (Tex. App. June 28, 2004) (holding that a unilateral contract “becomes enforceable if the 
party seeking to enforce the contract has performed, conferring even a remote benefit on the 
other party”). 
 205.  Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.
L. & TECH 1, 8 (1999).  
 206.  Howell, supra note 7, at 81.  In the Grocela case, however, the Massachusetts 
court did not follow this standard.  2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206. 
 207.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66–57.1, 66–57.2 (West 2012); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 
2870–72 (West 2011); WASH REV. CODE §§ 49.44.140–150 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44–130 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. 19 § 805 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
181.78 (West 2006); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1060/2 (West 2001) (indicating various 
examples of such limitations). 
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Minnesota’s law.208  They do not confer specific rights on employees but 
limit the enforcement of the contract if such a contract attempts to bind 
employees beyond statute limitations.209  Generally, statutes modeled after 
Minnesota’s law prohibit employers from requiring invention assignment 
agreements unrelated to the employee’s work or the employer’s business.210
However, as seen in Grocela, the courts interpret this provision broadly.  In 
that case the fact that an invention related to medical intervention was related 
to the hospital’s business even though it was not related to Grocela’s area of 
specialty and practice.211
Statutes in two states – Utah and Nevada – take the pro-employer 
approach.212  In Utah, the statute permits employers to acquire rights to 
employees’ later inventions through invention assignment agreements, even 
if the invention is created outside of work on the employee’s own time.213
Nevada, however, eliminates the need for assignment agreements altogether.  
Employer ownership of inventions created while employed is the default 
status.  The statute, passed by the state legislature in 2001, provides: “Except 
as otherwise provided by express written agreement, an employer is the sole 
owner of any patentable invention or trade secret developed by his employee 
during the course of the employment that relates directly to work performed 
during the course of the employment.”214
Nevada’s approach is controversial.215  It represents the opposite of the 
basic premise of patent law that the Stanford v. Roche Court found so 
compelling: “rights to an invention belong to the inventor.”216  Undoubtedly, 
Nevada’s approach eases employers’ transaction costs of securing rights in 
employees’ inventions, but to what extent does it incentivize employees, the 
individuals employers rely on to create? 
The facts of the Grocela case suggest that Grocela was more motivated 
to market and distribute his inventions than MGH.  MGH assigned the rights 
of his earlier disclosed inventions to Grocela and he created a partnership to 
 208.  Howell, supra note 7, at 89. 
 209.  See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The 
Role of Preinvention Assignment Agreements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J 163, 178 (1994). 
 210.  Howell, supra note 7, at 89. 
 211.  Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206, at *2. 
 212.  Howell, supra note 7, at 89. 
 213.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-39-3(6) (West 2011). 
 214.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.500 (West 2000). 
 215.  See Mary LaFrance, Nevada’s Employee Inventions Statute: Novel, Nonobvious, 
and Patently Wrong, 3 NEV. L.J. 88, 88 (2002) (stating that “Nevada has become the 
only state that allows ownership of patentable inventions to be transferred from one 
party to another in the complete absence of an assignment agreement, and without any 
form of actual notice to the transferor”). 
 216.  Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
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further the inventions to market.217  Although MGH’s Policy adequately 
protected its rights in employees’ inventions, the system may not adequately 
promote innovation and provide incentives to physicians to innovate.218
As one scholar notes, patent rights are more focused on invention than 
the factors that lead to true innovation: “implementation, replication, and 
extension of new technologies.”219  The patent system relies on market-forces 
to move an invention from idea to innovation.220
A. Protecting the Process of Innovation 
A lack of clear incentive to innovate when the need for innovation is so 
great, particularly in the health care industry, should prompt legislatures to 
explore other approaches.221  In the same way that the AIA changed United 
States patent law from a “first to invent” country to a “first to file” country in 
order to align with most other patent systems around the world,222 it is 
important to consider how other industrialized countries approach the issue 
of the ownership of intellectual property created by employees.  Japan and 
Germany provide two examples of legal approaches to invention assignment 
agreements that differ from the United States’ state-based contract law 
system.223
Japan, unlike the United States, has a uniform approach to assignment 
agreements through a law that covers both private and public employers.224
Japan’s law restricts pre-invention assignment agreements so that they only 
apply to inventions that result from the employee’s duties and relate to the 
employer’s business.225  Furthermore, the employer only obtains a non-
 217.  Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206, at *2 (describing an employer-employee 
transaction where invention rights were returned to the inventor in exchange for future 
royalties from sales). 
 218.  See Sawicki, supra note 10, at 683 (predicting the spread of talent-driven hires 
focused on the acquisition of intellectual property rights to industries focused on technology 
development).
 219.  Lee, supra note 24, at 34-35. 
 220.  Id. at 35.
 221.  But see Lemley, supra note 8, at 492–94 (discussing whether IP theory is wrong 
about what motivates people to create). 
 222.  See supra notes 118–124 and text accompanying. 
 223.  A thorough comparison of Japanese and German law regarding invention 
assignment agreements is beyond the scope of this chapter but a brief overview offers a 
perspective on the issue of motivating innovation. 
 224.  Vai Io Lo, Employee Inventions and Works for Hire in Japan: A Comparative 
Study Against the U.S., Chinese and German Systems, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 279, 
291 (2002). 
 225.  Henrik D. Parker, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
603, 616 (1984).
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exclusive license on the patent.226  The employee may elect to assign the 
rights to obtain the patent to an employer and may choose to grant an 
employer an exclusive license to the invention, but the employer must pay 
reasonable compensation to receive this assignment of rights.227  Reasonable 
compensation is based on two factors: profit the employer will derive from 
the invention and the contribution the employee has made to the completion 
of the invention.228
German patent law includes fundamental ownership rules that are 
substantially similar to the ownership rules in U.S. patent law.229  The major 
difference, however, is that Germany supplemented its patent law with the 
Employee Invention Act (EIA) to balance the tension between patent law and 
labor and employment law.230  Pursuant to the EIA, employers obtain 
ownership in inventions made by employee-inventors, but protect the 
employees’ rights to reasonable compensation.231  The compensation is a 
share of the value of the invention in addition to salary.232  In practice, some 
commentators note, due to the lack of definition or agreement to “reasonable 
compensation,” many employee-inventors are left without a clear avenue for 
enforcing their rights.233  Also, this compulsory license mechanism of the 
EIA eliminates freedom of contract between the employee and employer 
with regard to invention assignments.234  Nonetheless, it is useful to consider 
the role of compensation related to the value of the invention, or the profit 
the employer could earn from the invention, to motivate employees to 
innovate.  Similar compensation or reward systems exist in other countries 
 226.  Lo, supra note 224, at 282. 
 227.  Id.
 228.  Id. Japan’s Article 35 of the patent law grants the right to “reasonable 
remuneration for employed-inventors when the employee transfers the property right of 
the patent. . . based on the profits of the employer and the proportionate contribution of 
the employee to the invention itself.” Richard A. Kamprath, Patent Reversion: An 
Inventor’s Second Bite at the Apple, 11 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 187, 197 (2012) (citing
Japanese Patent Act, Act. No. 121 of 1959, art. 35 (unofficial translation)); see also Jean 
Healy, The Application of Japanese Article 35 regarding Reasonable Compensation for 
Patents by Employed Inventors in Syuji Nakamura v. Nichia Corporation, 17 PACE INTL.
L.R. 387, 394 (2005), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/10/ 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/SD2L-J2MJ]; JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, THE CASE STUDIES OF THE 
PROCEDURES UNDER THE NEW EMPLOYEE INVENTION SYSTEM 9-11, (draft) (2004) 
(referencing Japan Patent Law, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 35). 
 229.  See generally Takenaka, supra note 114, at 310 (discussing German laws 
pertaining to invention ownership). 
 230.  Id. at 284. 
 231.  Id.
 232.  Merges, supra note 205, at 43. 
 233.  Id. at 43–44. 
 234.  Id.
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that grant a significant number of patents.235
If Stanford v. Roche created uncertainty related to the Bayh-Dole Act’s 
role in intellectual property development and ownership, it also created an 
opportunity to consider what legislative changes could better motivate 
innovation, particularly in the health care industry.  One global perspective is 
that innovation may require a compensation system for employee-inventors 
as is common for employee-inventors in Japan and Germany.236  Of course, 
there are examples of United States employers that have instituted a 
compensation incentive to innovation.  The University of California system 
and other academic systems offer employee-inventors royalty-sharing 
plans.237  A system that extends the royalty sharing with other employee 
incentives could offer the motivation necessary to advance innovation, 
particularly for the new health care environment of major hospital systems 
built around an academic medical center.  However, not all innovation 
experts agree.238
Research in behavioral economics suggests that motivation for 
innovation decreases if large incentives are offered.239  Rather than focus on 
external rewards such as compensation to motivate innovation, the better 
motivator is recognition.240  However, assignment agreements do not permit 
innovators to “participate in the process” of developing intellectual 
property.241  The facts of Grocela documented that Dr. Grocela turned over 
inventions only to wait to see if the hospital system developed them in any 
way.  On three different instances, he requested the hospital return his rights 
to allow further development.242  Innovation is a process that does not end 
with the “good idea.” 
If health care systems want their health care providers to innovate, the 
systems must stop emphasizing the contracting for knowledge ownership that 
these broad assignment agreements represent.  Instead, rather than 
contracting for knowledge ownership, the systems must think about 
 235.  See Lobel, supra note 1, at note 148 (noting that “Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Finland all require fair compensation to the employee for any assigned 
invention” and that “China and Japan similarly guarantee employee-inventors a reward for 
assigned work”). 
 236.  See supra notes 225–228 and text accompanying. 
 237.  Kamprath, supra note 113, at 196 (noting that “[c]ompulsory royalty sharing 
plans may appear to be fairer to the employee-inventor, but they suffer from some of the 
same problems as other employer-defined compensation systems: the employer totally 
controls the system and t he employee-inventor has no recourse if left out in the cold”). 
 238.  See, e.g., Birkinshaw, supra note 12, at 48 (stating “Myth # 4.  Pay is Paramount”). 
 239.  Id.
 240.  Id. (noting that recognition and engagement such as participating in presenting 
ideas to senior management are better rewards for ideas than pay). 
 241.  See supra notes 122–123 and text accompanying. 
 242.  Grocela, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 206, at *2. 
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knowledge as Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom encouraged — as “a shared 
resource, a complex ecosystem that is a commons. . . .”243  Not only does this 
relieve the tension that Katherine Stone identified which is caused by 
violation of the psychological contract,244 but it also encourages participation 
in the true nature of innovation: the process.  Legislatures must recognize 
assignment agreements as restrictive covenants with long-term implications 
not only on employee mobility but also innovation and courts must interpret 
assignment agreements narrowly to achieve the mutually beneficial result of 
knowledge as a shared resource rather than an owned resource. 
Practically then, assignment agreements with health care providers who 
are not hired to research or invent but rather to provide patient care, should 
be negotiated contracts and not a unilateral contract embedded in intellectual 
property policies.245  Giving innovative employees the opportunity to 
negotiate their part in the process results in more motivation to invent and 
more emphasis on the on-going nature of innovation.  Negotiating 
assignment agreements allows implicitly for recognition of the innovative 
work of employees and this negotiation, in and of itself, provides greater 
incentive for the provider to innovate.246  Innovative employees may require 
monetary reward or compensation as part of negotiated assignment 
agreement, which, in turn, increases the short–term cost of innovation for the 
health care system.  However, it also provides greater incentive for that 
provider to participate in the process of negotiating, which suggests better 
long–term financial results for the system. 
In addition to negotiated agreements, legislatures should narrow the 
scope of assignment agreements similar to the trend of narrowing application 
of covenants not to compete and other restrictive covenants that 
unreasonably bind employees’ mobility.247  The expanding scope of 
assignment agreements to include ideas and concepts prior to employment as 
well as hold-over clauses for future inventions bind not only employee 
mobility but creative mental processes.  Firms certainly contribute to the 
development of ideas through learning on the job but that contribution cannot 
negatively impact the innovation process itself well into the future.  Firms 
have a right to reduce uncertainty through contract but they do not have a 
right to stifle innovation that benefits society as a whole. 
 243.  Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge 
Commons 3 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007). 
 244.  Stone, supra note 52, at 525; see also supra notes 52–53 and text accompanying 
(discussing this concept).
 245.  See supra notes 189–192 and text accompanying (providing relevant case law). 
 246.  See Lemley, supra note 8, at 492–94 (concurring with this assessment). 
 247.  See generally Bishara, supra note 14, at 288–90 (discussing restrictive covenants 
impacting mobility).  See also supra notes 54–55 and text accompanying (discussing 
restrictive covenants and their potential implications). 
39057-ple_19-2 reissue S
heet N
o. 85 S
ide A
      04/17/2017   09:23:23
39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 85 Side A      04/17/2017   09:23:23
C M
Y K
4_MAGID_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/17 7:31 PM
2017] MONETIZE VS. INCENTIVIZE 403 
CONCLUSION
Who owns knowledge?  This article traced the growing trend to 
contract against uncertainty in the information age so that firms may more 
effectively collaborate.  However, it outlined that such strategic contracting 
is binding employees in broad assignment agreements that allow firms to 
own human capital of employees not hired to invent — in other words, 
knowledge itself.  This growing practice in health care systems has a 
uniquely detrimental impact on the health of patients in the system but also 
the United States economy because health care spending involves 
increasing percentage of GDP. 
The impact of consolidation in the health care industry results in 
hospital systems focused on monetizing innovation rather than 
incentivizing innovation and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Bayh-Dole Act only encouraged a greater need for broad assignment 
agreements.  As health care systems claim ownership of health care 
provider ideas, the process of innovation is turned on its head.  This article 
argues that incentive to innovate is encouraged by negotiated assignment 
agreements that recognize the health care provider’s part in the process of 
innovation.  It further encouraged courts and legislatures to narrow the 
permitted scope of such agreements to the knowledge providers acquire 
directly though their work responsibilities limited to the time of 
employment. 
